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1. Introduction 
 
Privatization has been a key element of structural policy reforms in most 
European Union countries including Austria during the last decade. 
Governments undertaking privatization have pursued a variety of objectives: 
achieving gains in economic efficiency, given the extensive prevalence of poor 
economic performance of public enterprises in many countries and limited 
success with their reform; and improving the fiscal position, particularly in 
cases where governments have been unwilling or unable to continue to finance 
deficits in the public enterprise sector. In addition, budgetary-constrained 
governments facing fiscal pressures have sometimes privatized mainly for the 
reason to finance fiscal deficits with the privatization proceeds.  
 
The issues of privatization (and sometimes deregulation) have been reviewed 
in a large literature on the various aspects of privatization that has emphasized 
the potential efficiency gains.
1 Hence, we provide some theoretical reasoning 
why privatization is useful as well as profitable for an economy in section 2, 
and empirically present the extent of privatization in Austria and other 
European Union countries in section 3. In order to assess the impact of 
privatization in Austria on economic performance, we observe cash flows, the 
employment performance and the stock-exchange ratings of the privatized 
formerly state-owned enterprises in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 
                                                 
1 Surveys of the privatization literature are provided in Megginson and Netter (2001), Boes and 
Schneider (1996), Bartel and Schneider (1991), and a summary for the earlier discussion is 
given in Borcherding, Pommerehne and Schneider (1982). 
2 Since polito-economic aspects relating to income distribution and ideology play an important 
role in explaining the way, the extent, the speed and the economic effects of privatization, they 
have to be considered as well. See extensively Belke and Schneider (2004).   3 
 
2. Reasons for privatizing public enterprises 
 
For at least the last century, economists have employed a positive economic 
theory to explore the implications of profit maximization by private firms 
operating in private property contexts. Only since the late 1960’s empirical 
studies have been undertaken dealing with the behavior of publicly operated 
firms.3 Since then a large number of studies of a variety of activities of public 
or private enterprises came up and their main focus is the question of how 
public firms differ from their private equivalents. 
 
Basically two approaches are employed. The first is the property rights 
approach. It concentrates on the differences in the ease of capturing the 
economic surplus of a resource and the rights to direct an asset’s use, alter its 
claims from or transfer its claims among existent and potential owners. In 
short, this approach explores the differences in incentives between public and 
private agencies caused by variation in the ability of owners to monitor 
management and the problems that emerge when the goals of “owners” and 
their agents, “managers”, diverge.
4 Numerous studies have been undertaken, 
which have tested this proposition and the results that public enterprises are 
less efficient then private ones, is confirmed in most of them.
5 The second one 
is called “Public Choice approach” and concentrates on political coalitions and 
their effect on input usage and reward and/or product characteristics. The 
Public Choice approach also includes the theory of bureaucracy (Niskanen, 
1971, 1975). The public choice approach appears to provide a broader analysis 
than the property rights one. The public choice approach assumes that 
                                                 
3 See, for instance, Borcherding, Pommerehne and Schneider (1982), and Boes and Schneider 
(1996). 
4 The first approach has been developed by Alchian (1961, 1965) and more recently Baron and 
Myerson (1982), Grossman and Hart (1983) and MasColell, Winston and Green (1995).  
5 Compare the study by Boes and Schneider (1996), Schneider (1997, 2002), Schneider and 
Hofreither (1990). As these results are so well known, they are not reported here.   4 
politicians, bureaucrats, managers of public enterprises are selfish utility 
maximizers subject to constraints.
6 In this approach it is assumed, e.g., for a 
politician that he acts selfish in order to reach his ideological or personal goals 
under the constraint not to loose the next election. Since to stay in power is the 
most important constraint (or even sometimes a goal) for a politician, he will 
also use public utilities for his own selfish goals. 
 
3. The amount of privatization in Austria 
3.1 Privatization in small open economies 
 
If one considers first eleven small open economies in Europe among one is 
Austria, the results presented in Table 3.1 and in Figure 3.1 emerge.  
Table 3.1 shows that the amount of privatization was quite moderate at the 
beginning of the 90s with the exception of Belgium. The Belgium government 
privatized public utilities in the year 1993 and got proceeds of 956 millions 
USD, which are roughly 30% of all privatization proceeds of the small open 
economies in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1. The second highest privatization 
proceeds in this year arise from the Netherlands with 780 millions USD, 
followed by Portugal, which had a quite ambitious privatization program over 
the years 1993-1998, with privatization proceeds over 12 billions USD within 
1993-1998. A lot of well known public utilities in Portugal have been 
privatized like the power plant EDP, the highway system BRISA, and cement 
factories ZINPOR. Also in Austria the privatization proceeds have been quite 
large. In the year 1998 the Austrian government privatized firms with proceeds 
of 2.94 billions USD. In Austria the selling of a 25% share of the public 
telecom was the biggest deal, where proceeds of 2.33 billions USD have been 
achieved. Starting with rank 7 in 1993, Austria improved its performance in 
percent of total privatization proceeds in small open economies steadily with a 
                                                 
6 Compare Schneider and Frey (1988), Bartel and Schneider (1991) and Pardo and Schneider 
(1996) and Schneider (2002).   5 
peak in 1997 and at the end of the sample ranges at number three out of eleven 
small open economies. However, one should not overemphasize this pattern, 
since also in general the amount of privatization proceeds in small open 
economies increased over 1993-1998. In the year 1993 it reached the amount 
of 3.26 billions USD and in the year 1998 20.246 billions USD.  
 
In Figure 3.1, the privatization proceeds of small open economies are shown in 
relation to GNP. One clearly realizes the dominant position of Portugal over 
time, followed by the Netherlands and Belgium, which display enormous 
privatization proceeds in the years 1993 and 1995. In Austria, we have 
privatization proceeds in percent of GDP over the years which amount to the 
average of the small open economies under consideration. However, we cannot 
detect any systematic correlation between the degree of openness of an 
economy and its privatization intensity. In general, this makes external impacts 
on the speed and intensity of privatization less plausible.  
However, we will show in section 4 that this was not the case for Austria. At 
most, the (announcement of) the launch of the euro seems to have speeded up 
the privatization wave in Europe. In general, one realizes that the privatization 
issue and the proceeds from privatization have been a considerable and policy 
relevant issue in the 90s also for the small open economies.  
 
3.2.  Privatization in Austria 
Among those industrialized countries now awaiting further privatization, 
Austria is a special one characterized by historically strong interventions of 
government. Large parts of the manufacturing and the electricity sector had 
been nationalized after World War II, in part to safeguard the country’s 
economic independence after German occupation, and in part in order to 
finance the resurrection of destroyed large-scale industries. Jointly with public   6 
ownership in telecommunication, transport, and banking this generated one of 
the largest public sectors in Europe.
7  
 
Seen on the whole, Austria’s economy has been characterized by a relative 
important state-owned industry, a lack of own capital funds due to the 
comparatively small company size, and a predominantly bank-based 
investment system. In 1998, Austria was characterized by 17 percent market 
capitalization relative to GDP, i.e. an even lower valuation ratio than Italy (30 
percent) and Germany (39 percent) (Boutchkova and Megginson, 2000, p. 9, 
Table III). The globalization and Austria’s accession to the EU have revealed 
the structural problems of this system. Those sectors of the Austrian economy 
which have been protected from international competition like, above all, 
telecommunication, energy supply, and food industries had to be integrated in 
the internal market. As a consequence, restructuring programs have recently 
been launched focusing on liberalization and privatization of Austria’s 
economy. In addition, joining the European Union represented a structural 
break for Austria with respect to the incentives to delay necessary deregulation 
and privatization because it was now much less attractive to use public utilities 
and industries for re-election purposes.
8 
 
The Austro-Keynesian era of stabilization policy which lasted from the 
beginning of 70s to the mid 80s can be viewed as an attempt of “direct 
employment policy” in the public utilities and the public industrial sector, 
mainly in the basic (e.g. steel) machinery and chemical industry. In a sense, 
relatively large budget deficits and a continuously increasing debt-to-GDP ratio 
have in the past often been excused by pointing at the fight against 
unemployment. The primary goal of this type of short-term policy in private 
                                                 
7 See among others Aiginger (1999). Nowotny (1998), pp. 39 ff., discusses different meanings 
of ‚privatization’ more deeply in the context of Austria. 
8 See Clemenz (1999) and Nowotny (1998), pp. 37 ff., on Austrian public enterprises as 
instruments of economic and social policy as a means of avoiding labor market hysteresis 
(Theory of Co-operative Economics or “Gemeinwirtschaft”).   7 
goods markets was to stabilize employment and real income in the nationalized 
industry and, by means of the Austria specific inter-industrial relations and the 
multiplier process, in the private sector as well. To achieve this political target 
various steps were taken by the public management: the maintenance of the 
greatest possible level of production in the face of diminishing prices and 
demand; the greatest possible hoarding of employees even in situations when 
rationalization measures (dismissals) were required (resulting in 
unemployment on the job); an over-dimensioned propensity to invest 
(primarily with regard to the income effect of investment); an expansionist 
wage and fringe benefits policy with respect to buying power (causing high 
labor costs); and the financing of the firms’ deficits out of the federal budget. 
 
With regard to the social and re-election problems arising from unemployment 
and low incomes, the direct employment policy in public industrial firms 
intended to smooth the inevitable adjustment process to the rising requirements 
of global competitiveness in the long run. Naturally the pursued type of 
stabilization policy immediately caused substantial effects on the public 
industrial firms’ productivity, thriftiness and profitability, thus reducing 
international competitiveness and augmenting deficits in the short run 
(Nowotny, 1982). Nonetheless, production and employment could not be 
maintained permanently at a high level, because the rationalization measures 
could not be postponed any longer. Since the mid 80s, the Austro-Keynesian 
stabilization policy has been increasingly criticized for what concerns its long-
term efficacy. Finally, the troubling rise of the financial losses of the state-
owned firms in the iron and steel, chemical, machinery, and vehicle industry 
caused a turn in public opinion and economic policy. The amount of subsidies 
to public industrial firms covering the deficits and financing investment was 
limited to a fixed total and to the period until 1989. This change of policy 
emerged when the government realized that, due to the critique of the 
opposition, mass media and private entrepreneurs as well as to the people’s   8 
fear of tax increases, a majority of voters would not tolerate any longer further 
subsidies to public industrial firms. In this sense, the repercussion from the 
voter to the government worked quite well in Austria. Prior to this change of 
mind politicians had formed coalitions with the management of the relatively 
big and locally concentrated public firms in order to secure the subsidies which 
rendered inefficiencies possible and served the local constituency. Moreover 
there have been powerful shop stewards who were at the same time members 
of the legislating National Council and therefore succeeded in financing the 
expansionist enterprise policy out of the federal budget. 
 
From the end of the 80s there was a turn around in the Austrian policy with 
respect to the public industrial sector and public utilities. Not only quite a 
considerable privatization took place in the 90s but also these enterprises where 
much less used for re-election purposes partly due to the fact that - as stressed 
already above - after joining the European Union and the deregulation of 
former monopolies into competitive markets it was much less attractive to use 
the public utilities and industries for re-election purposes. In the 90s the 
privatization of Austrian state owned industrial firms and state owned utilities 
has reached over 6 billions USD within the period 1993-1998 (see Belke and 
Schneider, 2004). These dramatic changes in Austrian policies which gained 
momentum at the midst of the nineties let some authors even speak of “New 
Austrian Public Policies” (see, e.g., Clemenz, 1999, p. 1). Although a 
substantial privatization took place, the privatization potential in Austria is still 
quite large. In most cases, the Austrian government kept substantial shares of 
partly privatized enterprises. Considering the federal, the state, and community 
level and including all public utilities, there is a privatization potential of 45 
billion Euro from which the federal government owns 62%, the city or state of 
Vienna 13%, all other states (e.g. Upper and Lower Austria) 14%, and the 
communes (without Vienna) 11%. The latest privatization proceeds of the 
federal government over the years 1999 up to 2001 are presented in Table 3.2.   9 
 
In the year 1999 a part of the Austrian tobacco (9.4%) has been privatized, 
which brought 6.8 billions Euro. On 28 February 2000, the Austrian Federal 
Government authorized the Minister of Finance to issue the privatization 
mandate to the ”Österreichische Industrieholding AG” (OeIAG), the Republic 
of Austria’s holding and privatization agency at the annual general meeting on 
17 May 2000. In accordance with the mandate, OeIAG was required to transfer 
100% of the following companies or interests in companies to completely new 
shareholders, strategic partners or the general public: Österreichische 
Staatsdruckerei GmbH, Dorotheum GmbH, Print Media Austria AG, Flughafen 
Wien AG, Österreichische Postsparkasse AG, Telekom Austria AG, and 
Austria Tabak AG. 
 
In carrying out this privatization mandate in the interests of the Austrian 
people, the OeIAG had to “… obtain the maximum revenue possible, taking 
into consideration the companies' and Austria's interests” (OeIAG, 2003). It is 
important to note that the OeIAG depends on the instructions issued by the 
Republic of Austria. A second phase was envisaged at that time which involves 
examining the possibility of even further privatization. In the meantime, the 
OeIAG has already privatized further companies or parts of companies like 
Österreichische Staatsdruckerei GmbH, Dorotheum GmbH, Flughafen Wien 
AG (17.4%), Österreichische Postsparkasse AG, Austria Tabak AG, Print 
Media Austria AG, and Telekom Austria in compliance with the privatization 
mandate of the Federal Government. In the year 2000 100% of the postal bank 
has been privatized and the proceeds were 970 million Euros. Also 24% of the 
state owned Telecom utility has been privatized with the proceeds of 763 
million Euros via an initial public offering. In sum in the year 2000 1.742 
million Euros of privatization proceeds have been achieved. In the year 2001 
41.1% of the Austrian tobacco state owned utility has been privatized, which 
brought privatization proceeds of 582.2 million Euros. In sum, over the years   10 
1999-2001 2.455 billion Euros privatization proceeds have been achieved. This 
is quite sizeable and helped the Austrian government to reduce the federal debt. 
However, some Austria-specific features deserve significantly more attention.
9 
 
3.3  Backlogs of privatization and their elimination  
by the recent centre-  right coalition 
Observers often claim significant backlogs of privatization in Austria. One 
very intuitive example in this respect is the privatization of the two largest 
Austrian Banks which became a long-lasting and cumbersome process, if not a 
tragedy, from 1987 on. The latter was mainly due to political quarrels and 
arguments of the usual ‘too-big-to-fail’ kind and would by itself justify a 
separate public choice analysis (Aiginger 1999, pp. 14 ff., Belke 2000a, EIRO 
2002).
10 However, privatization gained momentum under Austria's centre-right 
coalition government which came into power in February 2000, and was 
mainly intended to help to balance the budget (the so-called Austrian 
“Nulldefizit” target). We take this episode as evidence in favor of the 
hypothesis that the democratic repercussions from the voter who fear tax 
increases if privatization would have been postponed any longer to the 
government functions in Austria today as well as in the past. Hence, one 
necessary condition for the emergence of politically motivated ‘privatization’ 
cycles, as we would like to call it, is still given – especially in this country. 
Obviously, the new government including the FPÖ has initiated a 
comprehensive reform process, including extensive privatization. It claims that 
Austria has successfully privatized the majority of its large manufacturing 
firms and will continue privatization in order to consolidate the budget. 
Following the successful sales of the postal savings bank, Oesterreichische 
                                                 
9 A further comprehensive and informative source of the history of privatization in Austria is 
Clemenz (1999), pp. 5ff. 
10 Astonishingly and perhaps due to the specific Austrian phenomenon of politically motivated 
decision making even in business affairs, neither the unions nor the works council of the Bank 
Austria opposed to the takeover of the Bank Austria by the Bavarian HypoVereinsbank. See 
EIRO (2002).   11 
Postsparkasse AG (PSK) to the banking group BAWAG, and of stakes in 
Vienna airport, Vienna's famous auction house, the Dorotheum, and cigarette 
manufacturer Austria Tabak to Gallagher Group of the UK, and the 
privatization of all hospitals in Upper Austria in 2001, further privatization in 
2002 was hoped to be successful. The biggest Austrian privatization in history 
was the sale of Telekom Austria to Telecom Italia for €1.979 billion for a 25% 
minority holding. A fourth mobile license was recently sold to Germany’s 
Telekom Service GmbH & Co. KG for €98 million.  
 
The correctness of our diagnosis of significant backlogs in the Austrian process 
of privatization is underlined by a recent study which confirms that the German 
civil law tradition negatively affects the probability of privatization. Bortolotti, 
Fantini and Siniscalco (2001, p. 30ff.) cannot reject empirically the hypothesis 
that countries like Austria seem particularly reluctant to privatize as opposed to 
common law countries. Moreover, Austria was not able to maintain its position 
in the top group in the current International Employment Ranking by the 
Bertelsmann Foundation. This gives some additional support to the main 
hypothesis of this contribution, namely that governments always time 
privatizations with an eye on their impacts on the performance of the labor 
market and thus on re-election probabilities. It states that the Austrian economy 
and the labor market are burdened in particular by high state intervention 
manifesting itself in abundant government outlays and a still high degree of 
regulation. However, the new government is endeavoring an extensive trim-
down of the state and the administration (Bertelsmann Foundation 2002). In the 
same vein, the Austrian reform commission (“Ausgabenreformkommission”) 
has tested the performance of the government institutions and has 
recommended that the state confines itself to certain central tasks. 
 
Finally, the importance of headquarters with high-value services, R&D with 
higher incomes in their surroundings is emphasized quite often (see, e.g.,   12 
Aiginger in Austrian Parliament, 2000). According to his reasoning, Austria up 
to now has too few headquarters. With an eye on this deficiency, one of the 
objectives of the privatization of Voestalpine AG declared during the 
extraordinary general meeting of the OeIAG on 7 April 2003 has been that the 
decision-making headquarters of privatized former SOEs are maintained in 
Austria. Most strikingly and in strict accordance with the partisan view of 
privatization described later on, the decision-making headquarters of the 
company to be privatized shall be maintained in Austria if possible through the 
creation of Austrian core shareholders (OeIAG, 2003). 
 
4. Economic consequences of privatization in Austria 
For Austria, aggregate productivity gains have not primarily come from inter-
sectoral resource shifts. The contribution of these shifts between 2-digit SIC 
sectors to aggregate productivity change is quite small for Austria.
11 Hence, a 
further promising candidate of explaining movements in the Austrian 
productivity time series is ownership respectively privatization. Both, the 
microeconomic and case study data are supportive of the positive effects of 
privatization over time on growth and employment (see, e.g., Davis et al. 2000, 
Megginson and Netter, 2001). These results reflect geographical diversity and 
are representative of a range of privatization experience in developing and 
transition economies. They hold for the European Union countries, but are less 
pronounced for transition and developing countries. The microeconomic 
evidence indicates that private firms are operationally more efficient than 
those, held by the state, particularly in competitive industries.
12 A strong 
correlation is also found for European Union countries between privatization 
and growth. However, and consistent with the growth literature, privatization is 
                                                 
11 Carlin et al. (2001), pp. 2ff. document for the case of Austria that between-sector movements 
accounted for 6.5% of the total between 1991 and 1996, i.e. 1.1 percentage points out of a total 
increase of 17.4 percentage points. In this sense, Austria is entirely typical of market 
economies. 
12 This was especially the case in Austria.    13 
likely surveying as a proxy in the regressions for one or more missing variables 
that may proudly be characterized as a favorable regime change. Public 
enterprises often seek to maintain employment, and benefit from staff budget 
constraints. Consequently, there is a concern that privatization may lead to 
increased unemployment.
13 Also empirical evidence suggests that aggregate 
unemployment tends to downsize following privatization (although an 
identification problem might arise with respect to Austria due to the fact that 
the country’s period of main privatization efforts is superimposed by its EU 
entry).14 However, particular groups of workers may still be adversely 
affected. In general, there are good theoretical reasons for privatization and that 
the proceeds from privatization, if used in a clever fashion in the areas of 
education, technology, and infrastructure, can increase the welfare of such 
countries. The main reason is that the classical public good argument still 
applies for these areas. However, is this generally positive picture also 
applicable to the Austrian case? What are the economic consequences from the 
privatization program for the Austrian Economy from 1990 on?  
 
It should first be mentioned that in the same period, i.e. together with the 
privatization a considerable amount of EU deregulation and liberalization 
(telecom-, gas-, electricity- and other service (…) markets) initiatives took 
place. Due to the upcoming of competitive markets in these areas and due to 
the gained efficiency of the privatized enterprises first considerable price 
reductions could be observed and second an additional growth of 0.1 – 0.32% 
per year took place over the period 1996 to 2001.
15 The origin of this additional 
                                                 
13 However, employment losses often appear to be widely exaggerated. For instance, the 
Communist Party of Austria (2003) argues that the number of employed in the Austrian 
electricity sector since the start of the „liberalization efforts“ has already shrunk from 33 
thousands to 22 thousands. If one uses the EU as a benchmark this number will probably be 
further reduced to 16 thousands. 
14 See extensively Belke and Schneider (2004) on the relationship between the institutional 
environment of the Austrian economy, e.g., its EU and the EMU entry - and the speed of 
privatization in Austria. 
15 Own calculations based on an econometrically estimated simulation model.   14 
growth was due to price reductions in the telecom-(-25%), gas-(-12%), 
electricity- (-13%)
16 sector resulting in cheaper input factors for the users and 
increased purchasing power for the consumers. In case of the partly privatized 
Austrian Telekom, solely the stifled competition and the EU directive to the 
observed effects on prices and the quality of output. Such an analysis is only to 
a limited extend possible for the now totally privatized VOEST, a steel mill, 
which today works in a totally different surrounding, compared to 1985, when 
it was a 100% public enterprise. Here it does not make much sense to show the 
figures (e.g. turn over, profit, etc.) of this firm, which in former times disposed 
of totally different products and a production technology than today. Hence, we 
refrain from giving current realizations of performance measures and only feel 
legitimized to convey a rough indicator of performance of Voestalpine Stahl 
AG for the time span 1993-1997. The operating income rose from a 71 million 
ATS deficit to 3.2 billion ATS profits in 1997. However, even this impressive 
increase in performance cannot be attributed to a change in ownership rights in 
the sense of a statistically corroborated causality relationship (Nowotny, 1998, 
p. 43).  
 
However, there are additional reasons why one should be very careful and not 
over-emphasize the above results. One reason is that the choice of firms for 
privatization has been far from random which might lead to an upward bias, i.e. 
to better than average performance results from privatization (Carlin et al., 
2001, p. 3). Second, the effect of an ownership change might be quite different 
for different performance measures. Third, there might be additional influences 
behind the suspected impact of privatization on Austrian economic 
performance. For instance, reforms of the legal framework with respect to anti-
trust laws and competition policy and the abandonment of price regulations 
took place in Austria within the same period. In Austria, privatization came as 
a self-enforcing package with more prudent fiscal policies, liberalization and 
                                                 
16 Average price reduction period 1996-2001.   15 
deregulation.
17 Hence, the following analysis of the macroeconomic growth 
and employment contribution of privatization and its impacts on profitability of 
firms in general has to be conducted with these caveats in mind.  
 
4.1 Labor market impacts 
We start with the discussion of the (un-) employment impacts of privatization 
in Austria, because this seems to be the politically most highlighted aspect of 
privatization in Austria. For OECD countries, among them Austria, current 
privatization receipts cannot be rejected empirically to have a significant 
diminishing effect on the current unemployment rate (implementation, new 
entry in the market), but a positive effect on the previous period‘s 
unemployment rate (announcement, restructuring). A potential explanation for 
this time pattern might be that when privatization and, thus, restructuring is 
announced firms feel inclined to operate more efficiently. If, as a next step, 
privatization is implemented, there is new market entry which increases labor 
demand and lowers unemployment (Katsoulakos and Likoyanni, 2002). Similar 
results can be found for instance in Megginson and Netter (2001) and some 
other studies for developing countries not to be cited here. However we would 
not like to push our interpretation of the Austrian case much further in view of 
the fact that the studies cited above do not give, for instance, fixed effects 
estimations of the idiosyncratic privatization impact in Austria. If the analysis 
is limited to the employment performance of Austrian firms after privatization, 
the general picture changes and one cannot reject the hypothesis of no change 
in employment after privatization. This is at least valid for Austria’s early 
privatizations of Austria Microsystems, Austrian Airlines, Böhler-Uddeholm, 
                                                 
17 Nowotny 1998, pp. 41 ff., describes the “Austrian experiment” of privatization more deeply, 
differentiating with respect to the character and form of privatization in terms of change in 
ownership, change in regulation, corporatization, liberalization to activities promoting 
efficiency and competition within the government, and change in competition. Privatization 
does not necessarily imply a withdrawal of the state from economic policy. The government 
still has to define the conditions for an efficient activity of enterprises and to meet 
precautionary measures against market failure, namely measures in the area of competition 
policy and antitrust law as well as in environmental policy. See Nowotny (1998), p. 46.   16 
Energieversorgung Niederösterreich, Flughafen Wien Schwechat, Flender, 
Immotrust, OMV, Voestalpine Eisenbahntechnik, Voestalpine Technologie, 
Voestalpine Stahl and Voith which took place from 1987 to 1995 
(Schaffhauser-Linzatti 2003). Moreover, in some cases production capacities 
were shifted towards foreign countries in the wake of privatization, in the case 
of Austria especially to Central and Eastern European countries (see e.g., the 
Semperit AG) which might overlap with the otherwise positive employment 
impact in Austria and create some empirical identification problems. 
 
However, we should not only focus on the employment and growth impacts of 
privatization in Austria but also care about the effect of privatization on the 
development of capital markets. New share listings on the Vienna stock 
exchange can directly create some net new wealth and a limited number of 
additional high-skilled jobs, but the main economic benefit from more efficient 
and liquid capital markets arises from the financing opportunities and 
monitoring possibilities these markets deliver. Moreover, efficient capital 
markets foster economic growth and grant individual firms to fund investment 
opportunities they otherwise would have to forgo (see, e.g., Belke, Fehn and 
Foster, 2003). Hence, privatization appears valuable in view of whatever direct 
role it has played in promoting the highly underdeveloped stock market 
development in Austria (through new share offerings), and for the indirect role 
it might have had also in Austrian bond market development (Megginson and 
Netter, 2001, p. 44). 
 
4.2 Impacts on corporate performance 
However, evidence is more ambiguous with respect to the impacts of 
privatizations  on corporate performance in general. Some studies point 
towards the absence of a clear and unambiguous effect of changes in ownership 
on the economic performance of the affected firms and of the economy in 
general. Evidence that privatization enhances performance has not in all cases   17 
emerged from the Austrian data. For instance, Schaffhauser-Linzatti (2003) 
studies the change in operating and financial performance of Austrian firms 
Austria Microsystems, Austrian Airlines, Böhler-Uddeholm, 
Energieversorgung Niederösterreich, Flughafen Wien Schwechat, Flender, 
Immotrust, OMV, Voestalpine Eisenbahntechnik, Voestalpine Technologie, 
Voestalpine Stahl and Voith that were either partly or fully privatized during 
the period of 1987-1995. Using accounting data prior to and after the 
privatization, she measures the change in efficiency, profitability, capital 
structure, investment behavior, and employment (number of employees) for 
inflation- and business cycle-adjusted data. While profitability (i.e., the return 
on turnover, the return on equity and the return on total capital) and efficiency 
(alternatively measured as sales per employee, return per employee and staff 
costs per employee) displays a significant change between the period of state 
ownership and privatization the other measures exhibit no significant change. 
Hence, she concludes that the Austrian privatization program was not that 
successful as compared to other international experience. Reasons for these 
quite unexpected results are the small sample included in this study, the partial 
instead of total privatization of most of the enterprises and the structure of the 
management. Here, the number and the persons of the board of directors nearly 
was kept constant, so there were only few possibilities to install new 
management techniques and a new leadership of the privatized Austrian firms. 
Moreover, after privatization there was on average a decrease in salaries of 
board members by 2.6 percent indicating either a lack of incentives after 
privatization or too high salaries before privatization.
18 Gugler (1998) aims to 
add to the knowledge about the effects of privatization on the economic 
performance of former state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Austria. He assesses 
ownership structure (e.g., concentration) and the relative importance of the 
                                                 
18 However, Schaffhauser-Linzatti and Dockner (1999) conclude that there was no significant 
change between the period of state ownership and privatization with respect to efficiency, 
leverage, investment behavior and output. Instead, they are able to identify a significant change 
for profitability and employment. See also Clemenz (1999), p. 21.   18 
investor categories banks, the state, families, and domestic and foreign firms on 
the basis of a sample of 600 of the largest non-financial corporations. Balance 
sheet data, internal rates of return calculations and regression estimates show 
that not only ownership concentration, but also the identity of the large 
controlling shareholder is relevant to efficient governance of corporations. 
While foreign control increases profitability, particularly state control is 
detrimental to shareholder wealth maximization (see also Clemenz, 1999, p. 
21). 
 
With respect to the capital market, it must not be forgotten that the “New 
Austrian” privatization policy significantly enhanced the role of the Vienna 
stock exchange itself.
19 This can be highlighted by two measures. First, during 
the period 1992 to 1997, around 45 percent of the total volume of new issues 
on the Vienna stock exchange consisted of issues by the OeIAG. Second, 
shares of privatized enterprises were responsible for 34.5 percent of the 
turnover on this stock exchange in the year 1997 (Nowotny, 1998, p. 43). 
Another important question is whether there has been a significant impact of 
privatization on the performance of the shares. In the years 1993 to 1997, the 
performance of shares of privatized enterprises was significantly better than the 
trend increase of the Vienna stock exchange as a whole (Nowotny, 1998, p. 
43). The relative importance of share issue privatizations (SIPs) in Austria can 
be read off from their relative position among Austrian firms in terms of the 
single firm’s market capitalization as a percentage of the entire national 
market’s year-end 1999. In Austria, privatized companies are the second most 
valuable firms (Megginson and Netter 2001, p. 43). Worldwide, large SIPs 
played a key role in the growth of capital markets almost everywhere, 
especially because they are generally among the largest firms in national 
markets. Davidson (1998) investigates 1, 3, 5, and 10-year market adjusted 
                                                 
19 See Nowotny (1998), p. 43. Nevertheless, the role of the Vienna stock exchange was still 
limited until Eastern enlargement of the EU.   19 
returns for these SIPs from five European countries (Austria, France, Italy, 
Spain, and the UK) through March 1997. After a long period of under-
performance, averaging 1-1.5% per year, he concludes that SIPs out-performed 
European market averages during the previous 12 months. 
 
4.3 Impacts on the performance of ATX stocks 
Just for illustration purposes, we now start by focusing on two recent 
individual examples of Austrian privatization, namely the Vienna Airport and 
Telekom Austria. At this stage of analysis we dispense with using benchmarks 
(e.g., the trend of the Vienna stock exchange or the ATX as a whole) and also 
neglect potentially missing thirds factors (e.g., an overlap with speculative 
bubbles). The main question we tackle is whether we are able to observe an 
increasing profitability of privatized firms, i.e. an increased value of the shares, 
after privatization at the Vienna stock exchange? This view is certainly not 
corroborated with respect to Vienna Airport, but it cannot be excluded for 
Austrian Telekom (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2). Note that the date of complete 
privatization of Vienna Airport was March 2001. Its starting price at the 
Vienna stock exchange (closing) was 37.9 Euros, its price in April 2001 rose to 
39.1 Euros. In the last two thirds of the sample the trend development of the 
airport shares was significantly negative. However, a totally different picture 
emerged from trade in Telekom shares which started in Vienna and New York 
on November 21, 2000. At the beginning, the 75 percent shareholder OeAIG 
announced a share price of 123.8 ATS respectively around 9 Euros. However, 
the price of Telekom shares (closing) fell immediately after the first 
privatization issue to a price of 6 euros in order to recover again and increase 
with a positive trend.  
 
In order to arrive at a more systematic picture and to build our conclusions on a 
more solid basis, we finally compare the change of performance of the 11 
(partly) privatized Austrian firms to the change of performance of their   20 
international competitors with in the same industrial sector from December 30, 
1994, to November 22, 2000.
20 The performance of Austria’s early 
privatizations (see section 4.1) is measured as a first step as the development of 
share prices and as a second step as the dividend yield, each time vis-à-vis a 
benchmark. The results for share prices are displayed in Table 4.1. 
 
Within the sample and expressed in dollars, 7 out of 11 Austrian stocks 
underperformed the Morgan Stanley international sectoral indices (MSCI). 
However, this has to be traced back to a significant extent to the strong dollar 
vis-à-vis the euro. Only 4 out of 11 shares, namely those of Austria Tabak AG, 
Böhler-Uddeholm AG, VA Stahl AG and the Verbundgesellschaft displayed a 
better performance than their international counterparts, although in the cases 
of Austria Tabak and Böhler-Uddeholm only marginally (1 and 7 percent, 
respectively).
21 The only Austrian stock which experienced a significantly 
better performance than the index of the metal and steel sector is VA Stahl. 
Moreover, in only 3 out of the 11 cases of privatized Austrian firms did the 
shares increase their initial values and, hence, improved their performance 
(AMS AG, Austria Tabak AG, Verbundgesellschaft). 
 
If one looks at the sectoral disaggregation of the performance revenues from 
privatization, it becomes obvious that both shares of the steel sector (Böhler-
Uddeholm and VA Stahl AG) clearly outperformed the international sectoral 
index for metals and steel. Just the opposite is valid with respect to the 
transportation and airlines sector. Here, the AUA and the Vienna Airport AG 
underperformed their international competitors. In this sense, our results from 
Figure 4.1 for the Vienna Airport shares are corroborated again.  
                                                 
20 However, if quotation starts later than on December 30, 1994, we refer to the first trading 
day. Telekom Austria is not included in the sample because it was privatized not earlier than 
after the end of the sample considered here. 
21 The result for Austrian Tabak becomes even more ambiguous, if one takes into account that 
there were rumors of a takeover of the OeIAG shares of Austrian Tabak by the German 
Reemtsma group during the days after November 22
nd, 2000.   21 
 
With respect to the utilities and the electrical & gas sector, the picture is mixed 
for Austria. On the one hand, the international index outperformed the EVN 
share. On the other hand, the price of the Verbundgesellschaft share 
experienced the highest price growth (+49 percent) of all 11 Austrian ATX 
shares considered here and performed better than the international electrical & 
gas sector benchmark. Hence, privatization in the Austrian metals and steel 
sector appears to be more efficient than privatization in the transportation and 
airlines sector. The result with respect to the utilities and the electrical & gas 
sector is ambiguous. 
 
However, our assessment of the benefits of privatization in Austria changes 
significantly if the dividend yield is investigated instead of share prices as a 
measure of profitability of privatization. Table 4.2 summarizes the pattern of 
dividend yields of early privatized Austrian firms in the first year after going 
public (or if shares were issued after June 30, in the following year). This table 
reveals that in the first year of comparison, only 2 out of 11 Austrian firms 
really gain a higher dividend yield than their European competitors.
22 Only the 
Austrian Tabak AG (+3.83 percent) and the VA Tech AG (+2.18 percent) 
earned higher dividend yields than their most important European counterparts. 
In the following, we show that the pessimistic result change if we focus on a 
more recent business year. Here, the profitability gains of privatization seem to 
have materialized to a larger extent. Hence, we would conclude that there is a 
time-to-build effect at work. Table 4.3 displays a systematic comparison of the 
Austrian dividend yields from the business year 1999 with those of their 
international competitors. According to this analysis, the dividend yields of 6 
out of 11 Austrian firms (Austria Tabak AG, Bank Austria AG, Böhler-
Uddeholm AG, OMV AG, VA Stahl AG, VA Tech AG) outperformed those of 
                                                 
22 In the year 1994, ST Microelectronics SA did not exist and the Scottish Power PLC was not 
founded earlier than 1991. Hence, we do not attach too much importance t  the results for AMS 
AG and the Verbundgesellschaft in Table 4.2.   22 
their international competitors. This extraordinary performance made Austrian 
shares of privatized firms of course more attractive to investors. 
 
For four Austrian companies (Bank Austria AG, Böhler-Uddeholm AG, OMV 
AG, and VA Stahl AG), a clear time trend towards higher dividend yields 
emerges. As it was already the case in our comparison of the relative share 
price performances of Austrian firms (Table 4.1), a clear sectoral pattern again 
emerges. While dividend yields both shares of the Austrian metals and steel 
sector (Böhler-Uddeholm and VA Stahl AG) were lower in the first year of 
comparison and higher in 1999 than the yields of their international 
competitors. In contrast to this, the firms from the Austrian transportation and 
airlines sector gained lower dividend yields in both cases (AUA and the Vienna 
Airport AG). With respect to the utilities and the electrical & gas sector, the 
picture is again mixed for Austria. While the Verbundgesellschaft reaches a 
higher dividend yield at least in the first year of comparison than its main UK 
competitor, the dividend yield of EVN AG was in both years of comparison 
lower than that of the German RWE AG. 
 
Seen on the whole, we would cautiously conclude that both the performance 
and also the dividend yield measures point to the same result. Especially the 
Austrian metals and steel industry gained profitability by privatization, while 
this seems not to be the case for the Austrian transportation and airlines sector. 
According to Figure 4.2, the same positive assessment might be valid with 
respect to Telekom Austria. With respect to the Austrian utilities and the 
electrical and gas sector, evidence is ambiguous. Since the dividend yields of 
the 11 privatized Austrian firms in 1999 outperformed those of their 
international competitors, the underperformance of the shares of these 11 ATX 
quotations cannot be explained by lower dividend yields. What else might be 
the reason for the observed underperformance of privatized Austrian firms? 
First, the Austrian capital market seems to be quite weak due to the fact that the   23 
Vienna stock exchange is still small. Second, state ownership of (partly) 
privatized Austrian firms is still rather high. Third, one further important 
stylized fact about Austria is that the role of this country’s financial market has 
remained marginalized up to now. Hence, the varieties of possibilities to sale 
public assets as a constitutional element of privatization are severely limited 
(EIRO 2002). Finally, by selling under-priced shares in the domestic retail 
market the Austrian government might intend to attract the median voter, shape 
a constituency interested in the maximization of the value of financial assets 
and averse to redistribution policies to the left (Perotti (1995) and Biais and 
Perotti (2002)). 
23 In fact, for Austria there is first evidence that the mean 
underpricing of initial public offerings of former SOEs is 6.5 percent for the 
period 1984 to 1999 which was dominated by government participation of the 
ÖVP and a sample of 76 cases (Aussenegg, 1997). 
 
From this point of view, especially in Austria there is clear evidence of 
strategic privatization as a rational strategy to raise the probability of success of 
market-oriented coalitions at future elections.
24 Let us now finally turn briefly 
to potential impacts of privatization on the public sector fiscal stance. 
                                                 
23 Biais and Perotti (2002) show that privatizing governments that cannot commit to absentism 
are still able to reduce investors’ perceived probability of future interference by allocating 
underpriced shares to median class voters. Hence, the number of shares of the SOE initially 
sold and the associated underpricing will increase with the degree of income inequality of the 
privatizing country. 
24 However, also left-wing governments embark on privatization but mostly when fiscal 
conditions deteriorate (see, e.g., Italy). See Bortolotti and Pinotti (2003) and Jones et al. 
(1999). Aussenegg (2000) compares the characteristics and the price behavior of case-by-case 
privatization initial public offerings and private sector initial public offerings in Poland over 
the first nine years after the reopening of the Warsaw Stock Exchange in April 1991. He finds 
evidence that the Polish government is market-oriented, trying to build up reputation for its 
privatization policy over time by underpricing, selling a high fraction at the initial offer and 
underpricing more when selling to domestic retail investors.   24 
 
4.4 Impacts on the public sector fiscal stance 
Although the redemption of public debt itself is no sensible purpose of 
privatization
25, we finally address the fiscal effects/impacts of privatization on 
public budget deficits and on public debt. The reason is that exactly the 
budgetary impacts seem to be important incentives for Austria’s more recent 
strive for privatization. Katsoulakos and Likoyanni (2002) conduct an 
econometric analysis applying country level panel data of 23 OECD countries, 
among them Austria, for the period 1990 to 2000, analyzing the impact of 
privatization on the public deficit and the impact on public debt. They are able 
to show that privatization receipts are not significantly correlated with budget 
deficits for the whole OECD sample, Austria included. They also identify a 
statistically significant and negative relation between privatization receipts and 
public debt for the whole OECD sample which again includes Austria. 
However, any sound assessment of budget impacts of privatization in Austria 
should consider that especially in this country a higher number of sales is not at 
all correlated with higher proceeds (Bortolotti, Fantini and Siniscalco, 2001, p 
21, see also Belke and Schneider, 2004, section 4). 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
Privatization has certainly been a key-element of structural reform in the 
European Union countries including Austria and proceeds from privatization 
have been substantial in most of these countries. Gross receipts that can be 
transferred to the budget are affected by actions prior to sale, the sales process 
and the post-privatization regime. An evaluation of the potential uses of 
privatization receipts or proceeds should reflect the implications for 
government net worth and their macroeconomic impact. In so far as 
government net worth is concerned, proceeds from privatization do not often 
themselves indicate that the government is better off. Privatization has longer 
                                                 
25 See Clemenz in Austrian Parliament (2000).   25 
term implications in terms of revenues forgone and/or expenditures that will 
not be made in the future and government decisions on the use of proceeds 
should reflect this inter-temporal effect. Government net worth will rise to the 
extent that private sector ownership leads to an increase in efficiency and the 
government shares in this gain.  
 
The macroeconomic effects of privatization depend, in part, on whether 
receipts/proceeds are from domestic or foreign sources, the degree of capital 
mobility and the exchange regime. Broadly the effects of a decrease in the 
deficit financed by privatization receipts would be similar to those resulting 
from a debt financed fiscal expansion. Both the economic recovery and 
privatizations lead to receipts which can be used to lower the deficit. The use 
of proceeds to reduce external debt provides for an automatic sterilization of 
what may be substantial capital inflows associated with privatization. The 
reduction of domestic debt may impact domestic stability. Redemption and 
interest payments become lower by collecting privatization receipts. Hence, 
privatization takes some of the strain off the budget and the capital market by 
lower interest rates. This in turn increases efficiency which tends to improve 
prospects for the labor market as well after some restructuring period. 
 
Seen on the whole, this contribution has shown that there are good reasons for 
privatization in general although this strategy raises some opportunity costs and 
that the privatization proceeds are able under certain circumstances to enhance 
the welfare of these countries. With regard to Austria we are skeptical about 
whether Austria’s privatization potential has been exploited up to now and 
whether the speed of privatization, although quite sizeable, has really been 
sufficient. However, future prospects for quick and full privatization in Austria 
are rather gloomy although economic theory (Alchian and others) and also 
empirical evidence suggest that only full privatization as opposed to an only 
partial one is successful with respect to a better economic performance in the   26 
long run (Boardman and Vining, 1989, 1991). However, as long as politicians 
interfere with this process, there will be no straight development towards full 
privatization. This assessment is all the more valid with an eye on the Austrian 
habit to appoint former members of the Austrian government as CEOs at the 
Austrian privatization agency OEIAG and the state is still determined to keep a 
strategic stake in the latter. According to the statute of the Österreichische 
Industrieholding AG, “ … Austrian interests must be protected as follows: … 
the creation and maintenance of secure jobs in Austria, … maintenance of the 
decision-making headquarters of the company to be privatized in Austria…” 
(Österreichische Industrieholding AG, 2003). However, one glimmer of hope 
currently is that Austrian Finance Minister Karl-Heinz Grasser did not stop to 
reiterate in December 2003 that the state will sell its entire remaining stake in 
Telekom Austria, despite some calls to keep a blocking minority. The state 
privatization agency OeIAG, charged by the government with selling off most 
of Austria's industrial holdings, holds 47 percent of Telekom and is now 
charged by the centre-right government with selling it by late 2006. This seems 
to be extremely important since otherwise a continued holding would only 
slow down Telekom Austria in adapting to a fast moving telecoms market.  27
 
Table 3.1: Privatization proceeds in small open economies in the years 1993, 1995, 1997, 1998 and 2000 
 
Privatization proceeds in small open economies 




























Austria  142  4%  7  1.035  9%  4  2.020  17%  2  2.935  12%  5  2.083  11%  3 
Belgium  956 29% 1 2.681  22% 2 1.562  13% 3 1.467  6%  7  -  -  - 
Denmark  122 4% 8  10  0% 9  45 0,5%  8 4.502  18% 2  111 1% 8 
Finland  229 7% 6 363 3% 7 835 7% 5  1.999  8% 6  1.827  10%  4 
Ireland  274 8% 4 157 1% 8 293 3% 7  4.864  19%  1  1.458  8% 5 
Island  10  0%  9 6  0%  10  4  0%  10  129  0,5%  10 -  - - 
Netherlands  780  24%  2  3.993  33%  1 831  7% 6 335  0,5%  9 310  2% 7 
Norway -  -  -  521  4%  6  35  0,5%  9  28  0%  11  1.039  6%  6 
Portugal  500 15% 3 2.425  20% 3 4.968  43% 1 4.271  17% 4 3.256  18% 2 
Sweden  252 8% 5 852 7% 5  1.055  9% 4 172 1% 8  8.082  44%  1 
Switzerland  - -  - - -  - - -  -  4.426  18%  3  - -  - 
Total  3,265  100%  12,043  100%  11,648  100%  25,128  100%  18,166  100%  
 
-  =  Null or insignificant  
Source: Own calculations with the help of Belke and Schneider (2004), Table 3.2. Figure 3.1: Privatization proceeds in percent of GNP in small open economies in the years 1993, 1995, 1998 and 2000 
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Table 3.2: Latest privatization proceeds in Austria (Federal government) 
 over  1999-2001 
 
Year Public  Enterprise 
 





Privatization of 9,4% of the Austrian 
Tabacco AG 
 




100%   PSK (Postal Bank) 
 
969.5 Mio. Euro 
  24.4%     Telecom (to Telecom 
Italia) 
763.8 Mio. Euro 
  100%    State Printing Office  2.2 Mio. Euro 
    1,742.3 Mio. Euro 




17.38%  Airport Vienna AG 
 
54.1 Mio. Euro 
  41.1%   Austrian Tabacco AG  582.2 Mio. Euro 
  100%   Dorotheum  55.6 Mio. Euro 
  100%   Strohal Rotary Printing  21.1 Mio. Euro 
   713.0  Mio.  Euro 
    
Sum   1999-2001  2,455.3 Mio. Euro 
Source: Ministry of Economic Affairs (2002). 
   30 
Fig. 4.1: Performance of shares of Vienna Airport at the Vienna Stock 




Source: Vienna Stock Exchange (2003). VOL means trade volume. 
 
 





Source: Vienna Stock Exchange (2003). VOL means trade volume. 
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Table 4.1: Performance of privatized ATX-quotations 
Austrian stocks  Change of 
performance





AMS AG  + 20 %  Electrical & Electronics  + 411 %  - 
AUA  - 44 %  Transportation - Airlines + 35%  - 
Austria Tabak AG  + 2 %  Beverages & Tobaco  + 1 %  - 
Bank Austria AG  - 36 %  Banking  + 39 %  - 
Böhler-Uddeholm 
AG 
- 46 %  Metals – Steel   + 34 %  - 
EVN AG  - 31 &  Utilities-Electrical-gas  + 34 %  - 
Flughafen Wien AG  - 12 %  Transportation-Airlines  +35 %  - 
OMV AG  - 14 %  Energy Sources  + 99 %  - 
VA Stahl AG  - 19 %  Metals – Steel  - 49 %  - 
VA Tech AG  - 68 %  Machinery  & 
Engineering 
- 22 %  - 
Verbundgesellschaft  +49 %  Utilities & Gas  + 34 %   
Source: Sachsenhofer (2000), pp. 108ff. +: Performance of Austrian stocks is better than the 
Morgan Stanley MSCI industrial sector index (MSCI), Web: http://www.mscidata.com. -: 
Performance of Austrian stocks is worse than the Morgan Stanley MSCI industrial sector index 
(MSCI). Performance is measured as the development of share prices.   32 
Table 4.2: Dividend yields gained by privatized ATX-quotations (first year 
 of  comparison) 
Austrian firm  Dividend 
yield 




AMS AG  1.46 %  ST Microelectronics SA  0 %  + 
AUA  3.09 %  British Airways PLC  4.93 %  - 
Austria Tabak AG  3.83 %  Altadis SA  2.49 %  + 
Bank Austria AG  0.87 %  Deutsche Bank AG  2.32 %  - 
Böhler-Uddeholm 
AG 
3.25 %  ThyssenKrupp AG  5.18 %  - 
EVN AG  2.12  RWE AG  3.14 %  - 
Flughafen Wien AG  1.81 %  British Airports Authority 
PLC. 
2.56 %  - 
OMV AG  3.98 %  Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.  6.23 %  - 
VA Stahl AG  3.11  Usinor SA  5.96 %  - 
VA Tech AG  2.18 %  Asca Brown Boven Ltd.  1.77 %  + 
Verbundgesellschaft  5.25 %  Scottish PowerPLC.  0 %  + 
Source: Sachsenhofer (2000), pp. 110ff. +: Dividend yield of Austrian firm is higher than that 
of the international competitor. -: Dividend yield of Austrian firm is lower than that of the 
European competitor.   33 
Table 4.3: Dividend yields gained by privatized ATX-quotations (1999) 
Austrian firm  Dividend 
yield 




AMS AG  0 %  ST Microelectronics SA  0.05 %  - 
AUA  2.71 %  British Airways PLC.  6.03 %  - 
Austria Tabak AG  4.38 %  Altadis SA  3.52 %  + 
Bank Austria AG  1.82 %  Deutsche Bank AG  1.37 %  + 
Böhler-Uddeholm 
AG 
4.37 %  ThyssenKrupp AG  3.83 %  + 
EVN AG  1.82 %  RWE AG  3.19 %  - 
Flughafen Wien AG  4.64 %  British Airports Authority 
PLC. 
4.77 %  - 
OMV AG  2.49 %  Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.  2.48 %  + 
VA Stahl AG  3.69 %  Usinor SA  3.60 %  + 
VA Tech AG  1.83 %  Asea Brown Boven Ltd.   1.54 %   
Verbundgesellschaft  0.83 %  Scottish Power PLC.  5.43 %  - 
Source: Sachsenhofer (2000), pp. 110ff. +: Dividend yield of Austrian firm is higher than that 
of the international competitor. -: Dividend yield of Austrian firm is lower than that of the 
European competitor. 
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